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I.
II.

ABSTRACT
Monkey see, monkey sue. Or better yet, monkey takes a selfie, monkey
sues the camera owner for copyright infringement. This Note centers
around the controversy of a monkey named Naruto who, via his next friend
PETA, asserted a copyright infringement claim against a wildlife
† Stephen Schahrer, 2018 Juris Doctor Candidate, Liberty University School of Law. I
was inspired to write this piece when I read about the case in the news. Liberty University
School of Law Professor Tory Lucas was instrumental in helping me develop the piece from
just a fleeting interest into a full concept. I would like to dedicate this Note to my wife, Rhya,
because I could not have accomplished all that I have accomplished in law school without
her unconditional love and tireless support.
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photographer. Naruto claimed copyrights to selfies he took with the
photographer’s camera. The case seems silly to most—including the court—
yet, the case seized the attention of academics and animal rights activists
alike. Because animal art has grown in popularity and scientific studies have
increased awareness of potential animal consciousness, this case does not
come as a huge surprise. The case raises an interesting, but odd question:
can a monkey be considered an author, thus warranting protection under
the Constitution’s Copyright Clause and the laws that enforce it?
Recognizing animal authorship, despite the utilitarian arguments that it
could only bring good to society, would fundamentally change not just
copyright law, but American property law in general. Animals have long
been considered property, and the proposition of granting property a
fundamental property right is perplexing, to say the least. As it stands, case
precedent and history do not allow a court to expand copyrights to cover
animal authors. In addition to the precedential constraints, the threat of a
fundamental change in the American property law tradition ensnares the
concept of animal authorship in two additional “structural constraints.” Put
plainly, the separation of powers doctrine and the theory of federalism upon
which the United States is based disallows the courts, and could possibly
restrain Congress, from recognizing animals as authors under the American
copyright scheme. Naruto’s claim to authorship—if vindicated—could
completely shift the property paradigm in the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mahatma Gandhi once said, “The greatness of a nation and its moral
progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated.”1 Despite all of
the protections afforded to animals via animal rights laws, the case
discussed in this Note demonstrates that some believe Western nations have
not come far enough in recognizing the rights of animals.2
The case of Naruto the monkey would have likely been missed by even
those most attentive to legal news as simply an outrageous claim by an
extreme animal rights organization. The claim by People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA) was that a monkey should have copyrights to
his own selfie that he took with a nature photographer’s camera.3 The case
was dismissed by the Northern District of California as unsupported by
1. Can the Greatness of a Nation ..., PETA, http://www.peta.org/features/gandhi/ (last
visited November 28, 2016).
2. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016).
3. Id. at *1.
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precedent.4 However, the case seized the attention of the legal academic
community.5 The query it poses is fascinating and odd, all at the same time:
should an animal be considered an “author” and be afforded copyrights?
Many authors have pondered this question. Some have concluded that
animals should be granted copyrights while others have opined that those
who work with the animals (e.g., photographers) should be granted the
copyrights under a “work for hire” approach.6 Although the latter position
requires a less dramatic change in the law, both frameworks fail to address
the preliminary question that underlies the query: should the federal
government be the one to grant property rights (in the form of copyrights)
to animals?
When examined through the lens of history and prior precedent, it might
seem that the only barrier restraining the courts from expanding copyright
protection to a monkey, like Naruto, is the underlying assumption that
author in the Copyright Clause really means human author.7 A piece of
animal art or a photograph taken by an animal can often meet the
minimum standards of creativity and originality required by precedent. In
fact, some would argue an animal-human distinction is arbitrary.8
According to them, the only apparent bar, then, to an animal’s copyright
protection is the fact that the concept has not been recognized by legislators
or the courts.
However, prohibitions on copyright protection are not only due to
specific constraints plainly spelled out in the law, but also due to the deeper
assumptions of the American property law tradition.9 Granting animals
copyrights—and therefore property rights—under federal law would
completely upend the federal system of government in the United States of
America.10 As such, this Note posits that the expansion of copyright
protection is prohibited by two structural constraints11: (1) the separation of
powers doctrine and (2) the federalist form of the United States
government, or Federalism. The first constraint prevents the courts from
expanding rights where the law does not contemplate them.12 A proper view
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at *1.
Infra Section IV.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section III.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section V.
See infra Section V.
See infra Section V.
See infra Section V.A.1.
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of the judiciary’s role would disallow any court from extending copyrights
to animals.13 Plainly put, a court is restrained to only interpret the law and
not to create it where it does not already exist.
The second constraint is the theory that the national and state
governments operate within their own separate but often overlapping areas
of sovereignty.14 In addition, the nature of the federal government is one of
enumerated and not plenary powers.15 As such, the federal government is
restrained from acting unless empowered to do so.16 Within the realm of
copyright, it is the underlying theory of Federalism that prevents the courts
(and most likely the Congress) from expanding federal copyrights until
state property law has adapted and accepted animal property rights.17
This second structural constraint is predicated upon the idea that
property law is a creature of each individual state. Each state, being the
creator of its own common law property scheme, should be allowed to
decide whether animals are granted property rights and protections.18 It
would be an unlawful seizure of state power and transformation of property
law for the federal government to unilaterally expand animal property
rights via copyright protection.19 As with other developments in the law, the
theory of federalism would require that the federal government, even with
its express power to grant copyrights, refrain from expanding animal
property rights until property law has developed in the states to warrant
expansion.20
This Note will begin by discussing the background of Naruto v. Slater, as
well as the arguments made by both sides on the motion to dismiss. Next, it
will discuss the historical development of copyright law relied on by both
the parties and the Northern District of California court in its opinion. In
addition, the Note will discuss the underlying purposes of copyright law. It
will then lay out the various arguments that have been posited for the
adoption of animal copyrights by the federal government in order to
establish the reasoning behind the argument that case precedent and history
of copyright law do not allow for such an expansion. Lastly, the Note will
discuss the basic theories of separation of powers and federalism, and show
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Section V.A.1.
See infra Section V.B.
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See infra Section V.B.2.
See infra Section V.B.2.
See infra Section V.B.2.
See infra Section V.
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that these theories prevent the expansion of copyright protection to animals
by the federal government.
II. THE LEGAL BATTLE OVER A MONKEY’S SELFIE
“A monkey, an animal-rights organization and a primatologist walk into
federal court to sue for infringement of the monkey’s claimed copyright.”21
As stated earlier, this Note centers around the case of Naruto v. Slater.22
Before the punchline of the preceding setup is revealed, one should
understand the story of the case.
A. A Monkey Takes a Selfie
This story began in 2011 while David Slater was in Indonesia
photographing Macaque monkeys.23 Slater gained the trust of a group of
about twenty-five macaque monkeys over the few days he had been
following them.24 Slater described winning the monkeys’ trust in an exciting
narrative on his website: “I held out my hand and WOW, one held my hand
back. Shock! This went on for maybe 15 minutes. They started to groom
me, picking through my hair as I knelt on the ground, hunched over my
camera, but desperate to record it all.”25 Afterwards, the monkeys took the
camera from Slater several times, only to have Slater’s guide wrest it from
them.26 These incidents allowed the monkeys to become semi-familiar with
the equipment and to learn how to snap photos.27 Slater tells the rest of the
story on his website:
I wanted to keep my new found friends happy and with me. I
now wanted to get right in their faces with a wide angle lens, but
that was proving too difficult as they were nervous of

21. Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim
upon which Relief can be Granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6)), Naruto v. Slater, No.
15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (3:15-cv-4324-WHO), 2016
WL 9843651.
22. Id.
23. Louise Stewart, Wikimedia Says When a Monkey Takes a Selfie, No One Owns It,
CULTURE (Aug. 21, 2014) http://www.newsweek.com/lawyers-dispute-wikimedias-claimsabout-monkey-selfie-copyright-265961 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
24. Sulawesi Macaques..., DJS PHOTOGRAPHY, http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/
original_story.html. (last visited Aug. 29, 2017).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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something[—]I couldn’t tell what. So I put my camera on a
tripod with a very wide angle lens, settings configured such as
predictive autofocus, motorwind, even a flashgun, to give me a
chance of a facial close up if they were to approach again for a
play. I duly moved away and bingo, they moved in, fingering the
toy, pressing the buttons and fingering the lens. I was then to
witness one of the funniest things ever as they grinned, grimaced
and bared teeth at themselves in the reflection of the large glassy
lens. . . . Perhaps also the sight of the shutter planes moving
within the lens [ ] amused or scared them? They played with the
camera until of course some images were inevitably taken! I had
one hand on the tripod when this was going on, but I was being
prodded and poked by would be groomers and a few playful
juveniles who nibbled at my arms. Eventually the dominant
male at times became over excited and eventually gave me a
whack with his hand as he bounced off my back. I new [sic] then
that I had to leave before I possibly got him too upset. The whole
experiance [sic] lasted about 30 minutes.
It was like the joy of seeing your new baby learn about something
new and becoming enlightened with a new toy. They loved the
shutter noise, but most of all they loved their own faces,
“chimping” [sic] away in what seemd [sic] to me to be total fun
for them.28
The words of the photographer convey his excitement and passion, but
these photos would soon create both the most outlandish and interesting
legal battle of the past several years. Slater faced two legal battles over the
monkey selfies.29 The first, and still ongoing, is a battle for the
photographer’s own copyright of the photo against Wikimedia.30
Wikimedia, an online digital commons website, posted the photo and then
refused to remove the photo after Slater requested that the company take it

28. Id. One can sense the photographer’s joy and passion for his work. To view photos
of the monkeys and read the entire story, see http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/.
29. A selfie is defined as “[a] photograph that one has taken of oneself, typically one
taken with a smartphone or webcam and shared via social media.” Selfie, ENGLISH: OXFORD
LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/selfie (last visited
November 27, 2016).
30. Louise Stewart, Wikimedia Says When a Monkey Takes a Selfie, No One Owns It,
CULTURE (Aug. 21, 2014) http://www.newsweek.com/lawyers-dispute-wikimedias-claimsabout-monkey-selfie-copyright-265961 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
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down.31 Wikimedia claims that Slater does not own the photo, as it was the
monkey who took it and not Slater; Slater, obviously, disagrees.32 The
second is the legal battle on which this Note will primarily focus: the
Northern District of California case of Naruto v. Slater.33
B. The Legal Battle for Animal Copyrights
While Slater was in the heat of the dispute with Wikimedia, PETA sued
him, filing a lawsuit as next friend34 of the monkey who took the selfie.35
PETA alleged that the monkey—which they named Naruto—not the
photographer,36 owned the copyright to the photograph because the
monkey
authored the Monkey Selfies sometime in or around 2011” by
“independent, autonomous action” in examining and
manipulating Slater’s unattended camera and “purposely
pushing” the shutter release multiple times, “understanding the
cause-and-effect relationship between pressing the shutter
release, the noise of the shutter, and the change to his reflection
in the camera lens.37
PETA also alleged that Slater infringed on Naruto’s copyright by “‘falsely
claiming to be the photographs’ author and by selling copies of the images’
for profit,” and thus, violating Sections 106 and 501 of the Copyright Act of
1976.38
Slater filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.39 He concluded his introduction

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016).
34. A next friend is “[s]omeone who appears in a lawsuit to act for the benefit of an
incompetent or minor plaintiff, but who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not appointed as
a guardian.” Next Friend, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
35. Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.
36. The author will refer to the monkey as “he” in the article although it should not be
construed to imply any assignment by the author of anthropomorphic qualities to the
monkey.
37. Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1.
38. Id. at *1.
39. Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim
upon which Relief can be Granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6)), Naruto v. Slater, No.
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with the punchline, “Monkey see, monkey sue is not good law[—]at least
not in the Ninth Circuit.”40 Slater argued that animals had not been
conferred standing to sue under United States copyright law.41 He stated
that “[t]he standing inquiry for animals under Cetacean Community is very
simple: unless Congress has plainly stated that animals have standing to sue,
the federal courts will not read any legislation to confer statutory standing
to animals.”42
By citing binding authority that appealed to the separation of powers
doctrine,43 Slater made it clear that Congress has never authorized standing
for animals, and that until it does, the court should not authorize standing
on its own authority.44 The defendant curtly concluded, “Still, if the humans
purporting to act on Plaintiff’s behalf wish for copyright to be among the
areas of law where non-human animals have standing, they should make
that dubious case to Congress[—]not the federal courts.”45 The court
evidently found Slater’s argument persuasive, as it would ultimately rely on
this reasoning in its opinion.46
PETA, in its response in opposition to the motion to dismiss,47 argued
for an expansive view of authorship under copyright law which would grant
standing to Naruto. PETA argued that because Congress has the power to
grant standing to non-human entities such as corporations, Congress also
has the power to grant standing to animals.48 They then argued that the

15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (3:15-cv-4324-WHO), 2016
WL 9843651.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004))
42. Id.
43. See infra Section V.B.1.
44. This Note does not focus on the standing issue. However, the appeal to separation of
powers doctrine will be discussed later in the Note.
45. Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Standing and Failure to State a Claim
upon which Relief can be Granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6)), Naruto v. Slater, No.
15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (3:15-cv-4324-WHO), 2016
WL 9843651.
46. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016). “But that is an argument that should be made to Congress and the President, not to
me.” Id.
47. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Naruto
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324WHO), 2015 WL 9392544.
48. Id.
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Copyright Act “grants standing to anyone, including Naruto, who create[d]
an ‘original work of authorship.’”49
PETA relied on the fact that the Act itself does not define the word
author, but rather “borrowed that term from the Constitution itself, which
authorizes Congress to protect the ‘Writings’ of ‘Authors.’”50 Further, it
relied on Burrow-Giles Lithographic in order to state the definition of author
as “he to whom anything owes its origin.”51 PETA claimed that Naruto was
the one who created the selfies, and had no assistance from Slater in doing
so. Thus, “he is their ‘originator,’ the one ‘to whom’ the photographs owe
their ‘origin.’”52 PETA argued that Naruto’s allegation that he is the author
of the selfies53 was enough to give him standing.54 PETA further argued that
because the word author is not defined as specifically human, an animal
author should be granted a copyright, so long as the animal author’s work

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973)). The Court first
defined an author as “he to whom anything owes its origin” in Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884). Burrow-Giles is discussed in Section III.B.
52. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Naruto
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324WHO), 2015 WL 9392544.
53. PETA cites to Naruto’s Complaint paras. 1 and 2 which state:
1. Naruto is a free, autonomous six-year-old male member of the Macaca
nigra species, also known as a crested macaque, residing in the Tangkoko
Reserve on the island of Sulawesi, Indonesia. In or around 2011 Naruto took a
number of photographs of himself, including one image – the internationally
famous photograph known as the “Monkey Selfie.” A copy of the Monkey Selfie
is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit 1.
2. The Monkey Selfie is one of a series of photographs (the “Monkey Selfies”)
that Naruto made using a camera left unattended by defendant David John
Slater (“Slater”). The Monkey Selfies resulted from a series of purposeful and
voluntary actions by Naruto, unaided by Slater, resulting in original works of
authorship not by Slater, but by Naruto.
Complaint, Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016) (15-cv-4324), 2015 WL 5576925.
54. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Naruto
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324WHO), 2015 WL 9392544. As the case was at a Motion to Dismiss stage all allegations of the
complaint must be assumed true. Id. Thus, PETA argues it has alleged Naruto is an author
and that is sufficient while also arguing that Naruto legally qualifies as an author. Id.
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can meet the creativity and originality thresholds set forth by prior
copyright precedent.55
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The history of copyright law sheds light on the question of whether
copyright protection should be expanded to include animal authors.
Specifically, the adoption of the Copyright Clause, the development of the
authorship requirement, and the major theories on the copyright law’s
purpose provide a framework for answering this inquiry.
A. The Adoption of the Copyright Clause
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution endowed upon
the legislature the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”56 The Copyright Clause
was adopted with no argument and by the unanimous consent of the
Framers at the Constitutional convention.57
Copyrights were first recognized by the English Parliament in 1709 with
the passing of the Statute of Anne.58 This statute marked a shift in the law,
as it provided authors control of the rights to written materials, whereas the
predecessor statute provided control to printers. The printers used
copyright law to control the book industry.59 The Statute of Anne was
enacted despite heavy lobbying by booksellers who wished to maintain their
monopoly over the book trade in England.60
The Statute of Anne extended copyrights to book authors for twenty-one
years.61 “The fact that the author was entitled to hold the copyright did not
trouble the booksellers since they insisted that the author give them the
copyright before publishing a work. If the author refused, the bookseller

55. Id. “The statute itself makes it clear that ‘[c]opyright protection extends to all
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium” of expression.’ The only
requirement is that the work must be original.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57. Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers
Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 361 (1992).
58. Id. at 367.
59. Id. at 366-67.
60. Id. at 367.
61. Id.
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might not promote his book as vigorously.”62 Booksellers lobbied
Parliament to pass a law allowing them to maintain a perpetual copyright
on books, but Parliament refused.63 The booksellers then went to the courts,
fighting for a common law right to perpetual copyright.64 However, the
courts also refused to extend such a right. Instead, the courts found that an
author did indeed have a common law right to his work, but that this right
was limited by the Statute of Anne to twenty-one years.65
Accordingly, by the time of the American Revolution, English copyright
law had shifted from a mechanism “used to control the book trade to [one
used to] encourage authors to write by rewarding them for their efforts.”66
This was the first iteration of copyright law that not only required rights to
be vested in the author, but also used the term “authorship” in the context
of copyright law.67 The requirement of authorship would prove to be a
central concept in the development of copyright law.68 With such a wellestablished common law right to copyright, the inclusion of such a right in
the U.S. Constitution was unsurprising.
The goal of copyright law was to encourage the production of literature.
Aptly, the Copyright Clause’s stated purpose is “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.”69 In addition to the English copyright law
already in place, the Framers were most likely heavily influenced by the fact
that the majority of the states had already adopted Copyright laws
themselves.70 Noah Webster, in an effort to obtain copyrights in each state
to an English school book he had written, travelled to many of the states
and convinced them to adopt some form of copyright protection for
authors.71 For example, after failing to lobby James Madison directly,
Webster lobbied George Washington to encourage the adoption of a
copyright law in Virginia.72 Webster’s efforts resulted in Madison
presenting Virginia’s copyright bill in the legislative session of 1785. The bill

62. Id.
63. Donner, supra note 57, at 368.
64. Id. at 367-68.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 368.
67. Peter Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphases of “Authorship,”
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 468 (1991).
68. Id.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
70. Donner, supra note 57, at 374.
71. Id. 370-74.
72. Id. at 371.
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was signed into law in 1786.73 By the time of the Constitutional Convention,
twelve of the thirteen states had adopted copyright laws—due, at least in
part, to Webster’s lobbying.74
But why did the Framers federalize copyright law? The Framers needed
to create a national and uniform system to better protect the rights of
authors. “The frustration of Webster in his travels to obtain copyrights from
each state was well known throughout the states.”75 An author, if he wished
to obtain national protection, would need to travel to each state (as Webster
did) and obtain the rights to his own work state-by-state.76 This was an
unworkable system that did not create a nation of united common values,
but rather frustrated that purpose by requiring an author to apply to—and
comply with—over thirteen different copyright schemes. According to John
Madison, there was a “want of concert in matters where common interest
requires it.”77 He further added that “[i]nstances of inferior moment are the
want of uniformity in the laws concerning . . . literary property.”78 It was
this want of concert among the states that pushed the Framers to institute
national protection to the well-established common law right of copyright
protection.
The English common law copyright, the states’ consensus on copyright
protection, the Framers love for literature,79 and the republican ideals of “a
social system built on merit”80—rather than special governmental
dispensations—is what likely motivated the Framers to pass the Copyright
Clause with unanimous consent. As James Madison conclusively wrote:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great
Britain, to be a right of common law. . . . The public good fully
coincides . . . with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for [copyright], and most of

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 374.
Id.
Donner, supra note 57, at 374.
Id. (quoting DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF ROLLS AND LIBRARY, IV
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 17861870 128 (1901)).
78. Id. (alterations in original)
79. Id. at 375.
80. Id. at 376. For additional information, see infra Section III.C.
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them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed
at the instance of Congress.81
B. Development of Copyright Law After the Founding
Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the Supreme Court set out to
define what author meant within the context of a copyright or patent. The
development of the authorship requirement began with the early cases of In
Re Trademark Cases and Burrow-Giles. In Re Trademark Cases laid out the
requirement that any invention or writing copyrightable under the
Copyright Clause must be “original, and . . . founded in the creative powers
of the mind.”82 The originality requirement is what differentiated copyrights
from trademarks.83 In Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court defined author for
the first time.84 “An author . . . is ‘he to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.’”85
The Court also stated writings in the Copyright Clause included
photographs and that the copyright for a photograph belonged to the
photographer who staged the shot.86
The following years saw many changes in copyright protections. In 1909,
Congress passed a new Copyright Act. The Act broadened copyright
protections to copies and not just prints. The new Act also broadened the
categories of works protected to include all works of authorship, whether
published or unpublished.87 The Act also introduced, for the first time,
“language stating that the employer was the ‘author’ in the case of ‘works
made for hire.’”88 Later, the Copyright Act of 1976 would further
revolutionize copyright law by providing that works are copyrighted the
moment they are created, not at the time they are registered.89 The Act also
did many other things that further advanced copyright law.90
81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
82. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (emphasis omitted).
83. Id.
84. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 58.
87. Blake Covington Norvell, The Modern First Amendment and Copyright Law, 18 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 547, 564 (2009). The act also extended the protection period to 28 years
and included derivative works within copyright protection. Id.
88. Jaszi, supra note 67, at 487.
89. Blake Covington Norvell, The Modern First Amendment and Copyright Law, 18 S.
CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 547, 564 (2009).
90. Id. at 564-565.
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It is under this scheme that the Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Company, Inc. laid out the test to determine whether an
author qualifies for a copyright.91 The first element, as in Burrow-Giles,92 is a
“degree of originality.”93 However, all that is required by the new Copyright
Act is “[a] modicum of intellectual labor . . . [to] constitute[] [this] essential
constitutional element.”94 The second element is creativity, but only a
“modicum of creativity” is required.95 These two standards—creativity and
originality—are extremely low bars that allow the law to protect many
different types of works without requiring courts to scrutinize the creativity
of the author.
In 2014, the Copyright Office stated that a work must owe its origin to a
human author.96 It stated:
The copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual labor”
that “are founded in the creative powers of the mind.” TradeMark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). Because copyright law is
limited to “original intellectual conceptions of the author,” the
Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human
being did not create the work. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).97
The Copyright Office goes on to specifically deny copyrights to works
authored by animals, which includes a selfie taken by a monkey.98 The
Compendium specifically relies on the language discussed in Burrow-Giles
and In Re Trademark Cases to substantiate its prohibition of animal
[The] Act also extended the amount of “limited time” a work could receive
protection. The Act extended the term of protection to the life of an author plus
fifty years. The Act provided that works for hire be protected for seventy-five
years. The Act applied to unpublished works as well as published works. The
Act codified the sales doctrines and the fair use defense. The Act also explicitly
allowed photocopying for academic work under certain circumstances and
made a fair use for materials that are used for news, criticism, reporting,
comments, teaching, etc.
Id.
91. Feist Publs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1990).
92. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
93. Feist Publs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1990).
94. Id. at 347.
95. Id. at 346.
96. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
306 (3d ed. 2014).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 313.2.
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authorship.99 It was this section of the Compendium that the Naruto court
relied on.100
C. Theories of the Purpose of the Copyright Clause
Some would argue that “[t]he chief justification for copyright protection
in the United States is utilitarianism[,] [t]he active goal [which] . . . is the
pervasive diffusion of intellectual works.”101 Another author argues, even
more surprisingly, that the primary concern of copyright protection is to
“advance society’s interest in increasing creative output” which “does not
depend on the humanity of those authors.”102 Judge Posner opined that
intellectual property law is a “natural field for economic analysis of law.”103
He further argued that the law should seek to balance access and
incentives.104
Access is the ability of the public to enjoy the work of an author and the
benefit of that work. Incentives are the economic motivation provided to
the author by his ability to limit access to his work in order to recover the
costs of producing that work.105 The ability of an author to limit the
reproduction of his work—reproduction is generally much less costly than
production—incentivizes an author to create more works, since he is able to
recover some of the production costs as well as possibly make a profit from
his work.106 Posner sought to balance this private incentive with the public
interest in the fruit of individual intellectual labor107: “For copyright law to
promote economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least
approximately, maximize the benefits from creating additional works minus

99. Id. § 306.
100. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016).
101. Holly C. Lynch, What Do an Orangutan and A Corporation Have in Common?:
Whether the Copyright Protection Afforded to Corporations Should Extend to Works Created
by Animals, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 267, 270 (2015).
102. Dane E. Johnson, Statute of Anne-Imals: Should Copyright Protect Sentient NonHuman Creators?, 15 ANIMAL L. 15, 28 (2008).
103. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 THE J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325 (1989).
104. Id. at 326.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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both the losses from limiting access and the costs of administering
copyright protection.”108
The Copyright Clause’s purpose was written directly into it: “To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”109 It would seem that the
Framers, too, were balancing private and public interests in drafting this
Clause. To equate the private interest, as Posner and the authors above do,
to merely the economic benefit that accumulates to an author of a work is to
miss the fundamental foundation of the American property law tradition:
individual property rights.110
The Framers believed in the republican ideal that each person was equal
before the law, and that only a republican society based on merit could
achieve true equality.111 “This promotion of individual merit was likely an
additional motivating factor for a national copyright [protection] which
secured for the individual author a property right in his works.”112
The Copyright Clause was designed to protect what the Framer’s
believed to be a fundamental property right that vested in the creator of a
work. They saw the states’ challenges in protecting this right and sought to
create a uniform system via the national government in order to secure
intellectual property rights. Although they saw intellectual property as a
fundamental right, they also saw the need for the collective to benefit from
such works. Thus, the Framers placed a limit on the ability of the author to
hold the copyright when the Framers wrote that the right would only be
secured for a limited time.113 The Framers knew that with every
fundamental right there was a balance that must be struck between
protecting and incentivizing the individual’s interests and protecting the
collective’s interest in promoting the general welfare.114
In the copyright arena, the private interest is the fundamental right to
one’s own work. The public interest is to ensure that no individual would
profit on his intellectual work to the detriment of the public. The detriment
to the public interest that would occur as a result of a perpetual copyright is
not wholly obvious. To use a simple example, take a book on military
108. Id.
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
110. Donner, supra note 57, at 375-76.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 376.
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
114. For example, First Amendment rights are limited in the fact that one cannot yell
“fire!” in a movie theater. “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
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intelligence.115 The author researches and publishes a book about the subject
of military intelligence. Said author dies or slips into the “unknown.” The
author’s book is never published again so the author obtains no private
benefit. However, because of his copyright, no one else besides those who
own one of the original copies can learn from his research. The ideas of this
author die along with him. The tragedy in this situation is that the public
can never benefit from this man’s ideas, and the world, quite likely, is worse
off because of it. A limited time for a copyright allows the individual to
recover his costs in producing his work and exercise his fundamental right
of ownership over his ideas, but it also allows the collective to benefit from
his ideas should the author die or discontinue publishing his work. So,
while Posner’s and others’ analysis that copyright law is correct in that the
law seeks to balance public and private interests, the interests cannot be
categorically reduced to economic interests. There are deeper interests than
simply economic interests that are espoused by the American property law
tradition: fundamental property rights.
Another example of this concept is found in the Fifth Amendment,
wherein the Framers empowered the federal government to take property
from an individual in the interest of the collective.116 They placed limits on
this ability by writing that “private property [may not] be taken . . . without
just compensation.”117 The Framers believed that property ownership is a
fundamental right, but they also believed that not all fundamental rights are
unlimited. The Copyright Clause is no different: it protects the fundamental
right of ownership while it also promotes the public good by incentivizing
authors to produce works that will naturally benefit society.
IV. TO EXPAND OR NOT TO EXPAND
Many have commented on the ability of animals to obtain copyright
protection under the current legal regime. The most extreme position is
that animals surely meet the requirements set out by precedent, while the
most conservative position is that animals simply were not contemplated by
Congress as being able to obtain copyrights.118 In between these positions is

115. This example was taken from the following source and was simplified. See Donald A.
Barclay, Shouldn’t there be a time limit on Mickey’s copyright?, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://theconversation.com/shouldnt-there-be-a-time-limit-on-mickeys-copyright-53788.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
117. Id.
118. The conservative approach was taken by the District Court of Northern California
and the Copyright Office. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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the idea that photographers, such as Mr. Slater, should be granted
copyrights when working with animals, such as Naruto, under the “work
for hire” doctrine. The extreme position that animals may obtain copyrights
will be discussed in Section A. Section B will discuss the “in between”
position. Section C will critically analyze these two views, and then present
how history and precedent should decide the query.
A. Creativity of Animals as Justification for Expansion
Feist required an author to show both creativity and originality in order
to gain copyright protection.119 Accordingly, one of the first arguments that
prior precedent should cover animal authors is that animals can meet these
requirements of creativity and originality. One proponent of this theory,
Dane E. Johnson, has argued that animals do, in fact, have the ability to
create works that are worthy of copyright.120 In his work, Statute of AnneImals, Johnson argues that creations of certain animals, such as monkeys,
“‘[represent] the result of choices which would be described as creative if
the “author” were human.’”121
Additionally, another author, Holly C. Lynch, argues that chimps have
shown both a desire and ability to draw in a humanly artistic manner. She
writes about the observations of an ethologist Desmond Morris who
concluded that a young chimp “‘carried in him, the germ, no matter how
primitive, of visual patterns,’” or, in other words, the ability to create artistic
works similar to those of humans involving an apparently similar creative
process of making artistic choices. 122
Lynch uses these scientific findings to point out that, based on only the
creativity requirement, there is an inconsistency in the way the law protects
a human’s creativity, but not a chimp’s creativity, even if the work is exactly
the same.123 Lynch uses the example of a child and a primate to argue,
consistently with Goodall’s theory, that the only difference between humans
and chimps is humans’ use of sophisticated language.124
The author contends that if a child and primate were to draw a picture, it
would be impossible to distinguish the difference between the chimp’s
creation and the child’s creation, except for the fact that the child will be
119. Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
120. Johnson, supra note 101, at 17.
121. Id. at 28 (quoting Cindy Alberts Carson, Laser Bones: Copyright Issues Raised by the
Use of Information Technology in Archeology, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 300 (1997)).
122. Lynch, supra note 100, at 278.
123. Id. at 278-79.
124. Id. at 278.
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able to communicate exactly what it is that he attempted to create, whereas
the chimp will only be able to “‘ooh oh ooo’ in his chimp voice.”125 The
child, but not the chimp, can be granted copyright protection for his work;
however, both of them, the author argues, satisfy the creativity and
originality requirements of copyright law.126
Johnson and Lynch both address the fact that animal authors cannot
speak for themselves. They both argue that the law provides a remedy for
children and incapacitated adults who legally cannot speak for themselves
by the appointment of a guardian to speak on their behalf to the court.127 If
a child were to assert his copyright, he would need to do so through a
guardian.128 An animal should be afforded the same protection.129
Ultimately, both authors conclude that animals can meet the creativity and
originality requirements of the law, yet are not recognized simply because
they are animals.130
PETA made similar arguments in its legal brief.131 It argued that Naruto
is the sole creator of the selfies by quoting Slater’s book, wherein he
described the monkeys as possibly self-aware—i.e., able to recognize their
own reflection, able to work the camera’s shutter button, and able to pose
for the camera.132 PETA argued that these admissions by Slater show that
Naruto was able to employ his creative capacities to create the
photograph.133 PETA suggested that Naruto is the sole creator of the selfies
because he was the one to press the button on the camera.134 In addition,
PETA made similar arguments to those of Johnson and Lynch for
guardianship protection of animals.135 PETA argued that it was inconsistent
for copyright protection to be given to children and not animals because
children are allowed to devise and inherit by law. 136 They argued that this is

125. Id. at 278-79.
126. Id.
127. Johnson, supra note 101, at 34.
128. Id.
129. See Id. at 34-35; Lynch, supra note 100, at 277-79.
130. See Johnson, supra note 101, at 32; Lynch, supra note 100, at 277-79.
131. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Naruto
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324WHO), 2015 WL 9392544.
132. Id. (internal citations omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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inconsistent because children require a guardian to enforce their legal
rights.137 PETA presented the idea that even though animals cannot enforce
their own legal rights of inheritance, they could, like children, be appointed
a guardian.138
B. The Work for Hire Doctrine, Corporations as Authors, and Animal
Copyrights
Another, albeit less extreme, position on animal copyrights would apply
the “work for hire” doctrine to animal authors.139 The work for hire
doctrine was set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976. It states that “[i]n the
case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author.”140 Essentially, applying this
theory would punt the idea of granting animals actual copyrights. Instead, it
would just vest copyrights in a photographer who, like Slater, sets up the
camera for the monkey to take the photo.141 The monkey would be treated
as an assistant, or even as an employee of the photographer.142 Because the
photographer sets up the photograph, the monkey actually snapping the
picture would not take the photographer’s copyrights away. Similarly, the
copyrights would not vest with a human assistant photographer who
snapped the photograph set up by the senior photographer.143
In her challenge to withholding copyrights from animals, Lynch also
makes a comparison of animals to corporations. She makes the comparison
that corporations, like animals, are not humans.144 However, corporations,
unlike animals, are afforded copyright protection via the work for hire
doctrine.145 She essentially argues that if copyright is, in fact, limited to
strictly human authors then it should not cover nonhuman corporations.146
Therefore, because corporations are deemed authors under the work for

137. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Naruto
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324WHO), 2015 WL 9392544.
138. Id.
139. Lynch, supra note 100, at 285-86.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (West).
141. Lynch, supra note 100, at 285-86.
142. Id. at 286.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 283.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 282.
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hire doctrine, “author” is not inherently limited to only human actors.
Thus, animals should also be considered authors.147
C. Critical Analysis of Positions and the Current Precedent’s Verdict
One of the key justifications for the expansion of copyrights to include
animals is the idea that “author” has never truly been restricted to merely
human authors.148 Supporters essentially argue that because originality and
creativity are considered the touchstones for copyright protection, then an
animal that can meet these requirements should be protected by a
copyright.
In claiming that the Copyright Office’s conclusion that animals cannot
be authors149 is incorrect, one author states, “it can then be inferred that the
Copyright Office is making the conclusion that an animal is incapable of
[an artistic rendition].”150 This view of authorship presents several issues.
Namely, advocates of animal copyrights have incorrectly concluded that the
expansion of copyright law to cover additional works has created a
precedent that militates for coverage of additional types of authors. Boiling
authorship down to a mere evaluation of the creativity and originality
requirements misapplies the law; those requirements apply to the work, not
the author. Supporters of animal copyrights have wrongly equated the
ability to protect additional works under copyright law with the ability to
cover additional authors under copyright law. This falsely leads proponents
of this view to believe that precedent and history would allow the expansion
of the definition of author. Such a narrow focus on case precedent
completely ignores the issue of whether an animal author can truly hold a
property right, and the paradigm shift that such a recognition would cause.
The Copyright Office and animal rights activists rely on Burrow-Giles, In
Re Trademark, and Feist to help define authorship,151 but they often
misapprehend the requirements of creativity and originality as being the
minimum requirements for an author. To their credit, the authors initially
present the material as the requirements for certain art or other publication

147. Lynch, supra note 100, at 285-86.
148. Johnson, supra note 101, at 17-19; Lynch, supra note 100, at 276.
149. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
150. Lynch, supra note 100, at 276.
151. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
306 (3d ed. 2014); Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016) (15-cv-4324-WHO), 2015 WL 9392544.
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to be copyrightable; however, they then conclude that because animals can
meet these bare minimum requirements, they should be deemed authors.152
Although the authors seem to separate the two questions at first—can an
animal produce copyrightable material? Should an animal be considered an
author?—they often end up blending the two concepts, and in blending do
not recognize that ability to create and authorship are two distinct concepts.
For example, Lynch argues that animals meet the Feist test and can produce
the copyrightable work, as they are mentally able to create art.153 She then
follows this argument with a discussion on the law’s recognition of
corporations as authors under the work for hire doctrine.154 Lynch argues
that it is inconsistent for the law to allow a corporation to hold a copyright
while it fails to fulfill the requirements of copyright law.155 Lynch argues that
a corporation is not human and does not possess any human qualities
because corporations “are not freethinking, they do not have emotions, and
they are not creative.”156 Lynch challenges the humanness of a corporation
based on its ability to be creative—i.e., its ability to meet copyright
requirements. Since a corporation is not human, she wonders, “How are
corporations able to hold copyrights . . . ?”157
PETA rightfully points out this discrepancy in both the arguments of the
defendant’s brief and the defendant’s discussion of the Compendium.158 In
referring to Burrow-Giles and In Re Trademark Cases, PETA explains,
“[n]either case held, or even considered, whether a human mind is
necessary for copyright protection. Rather, these cases were addressing the
requirement that copyrightable works must be ‘original.’”159 PETA was
correct. All precedent that both the Compendium and the animal
copyrights supporters have used to support their position addresses
whether the work is copyrightable and not whether the author may obtain a
copyright.
The question in Burrow-Giles was whether a photograph would warrant
copyright protection, not whether a photographer was an author.

152. See infra Section IV.A.
153. Id.
154. See infra Section IV.B.
155. Lynch, supra note 100, at 283.
156. Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 283.
158. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Naruto
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324WHO), 2015 WL 9392544.
159. Id.
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Additionally, the test in Feist lays out the requirements for a work to be
copyrightable, not what qualifications an author must have. This distinction
is an important one. In fact, there are two questions that must be dealt with
in solving this issue: (1) whether the work is copyrightable; and (2) whether
the “author” is an author under the purview of the Copyright Clause. The
prior cases simply do not address the latter question.
In order to answer this question, it is appropriate to examine the roots of
copyright law because there is not specific precedent on point.160 Copyright
law was founded upon the need of the national government to protect statecreated copyrights.161 It was also founded after the common law right to a
copyright on original works by the author was clearly established. One
author admits, “It would likely not have occurred to the Framers that
anything or anyone except a human could be an author.”162 As discussed
previously, the purpose of the Copyright Clause was to balance private
interest of authors in their works with the public’s interest in the works’
consumption and continued production.163 Copyright law is inherently a
balancing of fundamental property rights and the public welfare.
Human authorship is the cornerstone of copyright law. The original
Statute of Anne was created to grant copyrights to authors of books, and the
English court eventually found this to be a common law right.164 Animals
have never had a common law right to anything they “create.” In fact,
throughout history and even in modern times, the common law has viewed
animals as property themselves.165 At the time of copyright law’s inception,
neither the Framers of the Constitution, the English courts, nor Parliament
ever contemplated whether animals or any other nonhumans could be
authors. Additional support for the modern intent of legislators is the fact
that the Copyright Act provides for protection for “the life of the author and

160. One case may be on point where the Ninth Circuit ruled that works supposedly
spoken by a celestial being were copyrightable by the first humans to record them. Urantia
Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court also stated that “for a
worldly entity to be guilty of infringing a copyright, that entity must have copied something
created by another worldly entity.” Id. at 958. However, the Court did not truly deal with the
nonhuman authorship issue here because the work was compiled with “human selection and
arrangement.” Id. at 959.
161. See supra Section III.A.
162. Johnson, supra note 101, at 19-20.
163. See supra Section III.C.
164. See supra Section III.A.
165. Vania Gauthreaux, Far from Fauvists: The Availability of Copyright Protection for
Animal Art and Concomitant Issues of Ownership, 7 J. ANIMAL L. 43, 70 (2011).
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70 years after the author’s death.”166 Also, the Act provides for the rights of
an author’s widow or widower after the author’s death.167 Although the law
is not explicitly clear as to the humanity requirement, these provisions of
the law clearly demonstrate that even modern legislators only meant to
cover human authors. To conclude that “authors” is an ambiguous term
within the Constitution or the Copyright Act is to completely ignore the
common law property tradition that exclusively granted property rights to
humans and the vast amount of context clues within the Act.
One of the concepts that animal copyright supporters use to substantiate
their argument that the word “author” has been expanded over the years is
the work for hire doctrine, which makes corporations authors under the
Copyright Act.168 However, this argument misses a fundamental point;
despite stating that the corporation is the “author,” the true author is the
human who is working for the corporation. Essentially, the law was created
so that the two-step transaction of vesting copyrights in an employee, who
would then contractually assign his/her copyrights to his/her employer,
could be avoided.
Furthermore, this area of law is governed by agency principles, which
mandates that works produced by an employee for an employer belong to
the employer.169 “The employer [is] . . . the visionary, and the employee [is
the] . . . mechanic following orders.”170 The American law tradition has had
a hard time separating corporations from their owners.171 Regardless of the
judicial application of human characteristics and protections to nonhuman
entities, it cannot be denied that these entities are made up of humans.
Thus, when a work is created for hire by an employee of a corporation, it is
not created by the corporation, it is created by a human employee.
Accordingly, the copyright is assigned to the “visionary” or employer rather
than the employee. The law did not create a new category of creative beings,
but rather structured copyright law to conform to the common law of
agency.

166. Johnson, supra note 101, at 20 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (West)).
167. Id.
168. Lynch, supra note 100, at 283.
169. Jaszi, supra note 67, at 489-90.
170. Id. at 489.
171. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2741 (2014); Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Although “[t]he Supreme Court emphasizes that the Copyright Act must
be interpreted broadly to achieve the purpose on which it is based,”172 it
simply cannot abandon its roots in the common law. Contrary to the
accusations of animal copyrights supporters, the law has not done so.
Therefore, despite the arguments that the current precedent would allow
expansion of copyright law to cover animal authors, this is not the case. Not
only would that abandon the law’s roots in the common law, it would cause
a fundamental shift in the paradigm of American property law. Such a
drastic shift is more appropriate in the states rather than in the federal
government.
V. STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXPANSION
The separation of powers doctrine and federalism place structural
constraints on the expansion of copyright law to include animal authorship.
The separation of powers doctrine precludes the courts from interpreting
the law in such a way that it legislates a new meaning. Federalism requires
that the federal government recognize and respect the member states of the
Union and their right to develop property law schemes.
A. Separation of Powers Doctrine and Copyright Law
The separation of powers doctrine is deeply embedded in the American
constitutional tradition and has been written about since the founding of
America.173 The principle that there are three distinct powers of
government—legislative, judicial, and executive—that should be exercised
by separate branches of the government was of paramount importance to
the Framers of the constitution.174 The reason for the separation was to
avoid the concentration of all powers into one branch of government.175 The
Framers sought, more or less, a balanced government in which the branches
that were selected or elected differently would need to cooperate in order to
govern.176 They feared a repeat of a monarchy that was able to control every
172. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Naruto
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324WHO), 2015 WL 9392544.
173. See e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
174. Id.
175. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
176. The executive is elected by the entire nation, the legislature is made up of locally
elected officials, and the judicial branch is appointed by the executive and confirmed by the
Senate. The system by design consists of both separate and interdependent branches. See U.S.
CONST. arts. I, II, III.
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aspect of the law and its enforcement; they believed and espoused a
minimalist government.177 Although a general theory, this idea provides the
basis for limitations on each branch, including the judicial branch.
The principle of separate and distinct branches touches every decision of
a court when it interprets the law. The courts must be careful not to expand
the law or even rewrite the law under the pretense of interpreting it.178 The
copyright law derives its power from the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution, and therefore, when interpreting or defining the word
“author,” the courts must trace the word’s meaning back to its original
meaning within the general grant of power in the Constitution. The
Framers would have never contemplated that an animal could obtain
property rights, and the precedent and development of copyright law has
never allowed for expansion within the realm of authorship.179 The only
expansion one can see is the expansion of the law to cover newly created
works of human authorship.180 Therefore, were the court, as PETA requests,
to interpret the word author to mean literally anyone (or thing) “to whom
anything owes its origin”181 it would be stepping outside of its role as a court
and would become a legislature. Because the original intent, and all the
subsequent precedent, points to human authorship, if the court were to
include animals as authors, it would utterly change the meaning of author
in copyright law.
It is not the province of the courts to create law, only to interpret it. The
District Court Judge in Naruto clearly understands this concept since he
concluded: “Naruto is not an ‘author’ within the meaning of the Copyright
Act. Next Friends argue that this result is ‘antithetical’ to the ‘tremendous
[public] interest in animal art.’ Perhaps. But that is an argument that should
be made to Congress and the President, not to me.”182 Despite scientific
advances in understanding animal consciousness and creativity, it is simply
outside of the court’s role to read animal authorship into the Copyright Act,
much less the Constitution.
177. Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the ‘Doctrine’ of Separation of Powers, 85
MICH. L. REV. 592, 601 (1986).
178. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. See supra Section IV.C.
180. Id.
181. Plaintiff Naruto’s Combined Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Naruto
v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (15-cv-4324WHO), 2015 WL 9392544 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,
58 (1884)).
182. Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016) (citation omitted).

2017]

FIRST, LET ME TAKE A SELFIE

161

B. Federalism’s Role in Constraining Copyright Jurisprudence
Federalism, in the most general sense, is a covenantal form of
government in which there are multiple sovereigns with different, though
often overlapping, spheres of control.183 In the United States, there is one
national sovereign and fifty local sovereigns (the states).184 Each sovereign
has its own sphere in which it governs. It is this concept that restrains an
enumerated national government from expanding property rights which
are truly creatures of the states.
1. Federalism Generally
The Framers created two levels of sovereigns, dividing authority in the
new Union “along subject-specific lines.”185 The federal legislature is one of
enumerated powers where “[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and
limited; and [so] that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
Constitution is written.”186 There are several modern theories of how this
division of power works and should work in the United States; however, the
Supreme Court has most closely adhered to the concept of “dual
federalism.”187 Dual federalism recognizes that the federal and state
governments have distinct and mutually exclusive realms in which they
regulate.188
183. This is the author’s own definition derived from various sources he has reviewed
over his academic career. Although it most likely can be attributed to various sources, he
cannot point to a certain source for this simple definition. This Note is not intended to be a
robust discussion of the various theories and definitions of federalism (and there are many)
but rather just a general overview of the federalist system and how it may prevent the federal
government from expanding federal property law.
184. As Justice Kennedy famously wrote:
Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of
sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by
the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in
form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations
to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
185. Ernest A. Young, What Does It Take to Make A Federal System? On Constitutional
Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Identity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 831 (2010) (quoting ALISON
L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010)).
186. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
187. Christopher K. Bader, A Dynamic Defense of Cooperative Federalism, 35 WHITTIER L.
REV. 161, 165 (2014).
188. Id.
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Another theory of federalism, Collective Action Federalism, sees Article I
Section 8 as a grant of general authority to promote the general welfare
(meaning national welfare) with each clause illuminating a specific instance
in which the federal government should regulate.189 Essentially, proponents
of this theory of federalism state that the purpose of the national
government is to regulate in areas of national concern which would require
a national government to regulate in order to have any law passed have the
proper effect190 For example, as discussed in prior sections, copyright law is
best regulated by the federal government because each individual state
cannot protect its citizens adequately from citizens of another state violating
local copyrights.191
2. Application to Copyright Jurisprudence
How does the federal government regulate copyright protection within
this system of government? To some, “[w]here the Constitution permits
one to regulate, it has plenary authority.”192 To others, the power of the
federal government is limited to those powers enumerated in the
Constitution only.193 Regardless of the theory of federalism that one
chooses, the issue of animal authorship presents an interesting problem that
challenges the nature of our Union. Undoubtedly, the federal government
has the power to regulate copyrights and this power was given because it
was necessary for a national government to protect individuals across the
Union from copyright infringement.194 The Copyright Clause, at its
inception, merely created a mechanism that would secure preexisting state
property rights across the Union.195
Despite the ever-expanding role the federal government plays, there has
been a recent resurgence in the Supreme Court, beginning with Justice
Rehnquist, of a federalism that respects the states plenary power over
certain core areas of regulation.196 That begs the question, does copyright
law implicate one of these core areas where states generally have plenary

189. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115–16 (2010).
190. Id. at 115.
191. Id. at 148-49.
192. Bader, supra note 186, at 165–66.
193. See e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
194. See supra Section III.A.
195. Id.
196. Bader, supra note 186, at 167.
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authority? The answer is emphatically, yes. Copyrights have their basis in
property law—i.e., the right to own or exclude.
The right to copyright was a common law right before the passage of the
Copyright Clause and nearly every state in the Union had already created
their own copyright schemes.197 The Copyright Clause was adopted because
the states could not alone enforce their own citizens’ copyrights, or as
Madison put it, “The States [could not] separately make effectual provisions
for [copyright]”198 and thus, federal action was not only prudent, but also
required to protect the common law right to intellectual property. The
federal scheme merely secured a preexisting state property right for citizens
of certain states against the citizens of other states. It did not create any new
“federal right.” The Copyright Clause implicates an area of the law that is
generally regulated by the states: property law.
The Supreme Court has dealt with the interaction of federal guarantees
and state property laws before. For example, in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, the Court addressed regulatory takings of land by states.199 South
Carolina passed a regulation disallowing construction on a certain island
due to beach erosion.200 The plaintiff argued this regulation made his land
economically valueless.201 A regulation by a state that renders land
completely valueless constitutes a regulatory taking, and the state must
compensate the individual for his land.202 Justice Scalia first reviewed
precedent, which held that the Takings Clause limits states from passing
bills that render land economically valueless in the name of merely the
public interest.203
Accordingly, Justice Scalia deferred to state law to formulate how
regulatory takings cases should be adjudicated.204 Summarily, he held that
the Takings Clause disallows a state from rendering land economically
valueless by a new regulation unless that restriction “inhere[s] in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”205 In other
words, state property law, prior to the adoption of the new regulation,
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See supra Section III.A.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1007.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1020.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
Id.
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would determine whether that regulation rendered the land valueless. If the
desired use were a nuisance, for example, then the regulation prohibiting
that use could not be a regulatory taking. “[T]he owner of a lake-bed, for
example, would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the
requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the
effect of flooding others’ land.”206
Without laboring over the Court’s takings jurisprudence, the principle
Lucas demonstrates is that the federal judiciary is required to respect statecreated and regulated rights—i.e., property rights. Justice Scalia deferred to
“background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance”207 in
order to determine whether a property was truly valueless before the state
passed the new regulation or prohibition. In other words, the right to
property and the right to enjoy it could be limited by state common law
principles without it constituting a regulatory taking. It was state common
law that determined whether the regulation was a taking and not federal
principles or jurisprudence. State guarantees of property were simply
secured by the Takings Clause and new property rights were not necessarily
created.
This interaction of state and federal regulation can help inform the way
the federal government regulates copyrights. Just as the Takings Clause is
limited to respecting how states treat property rights so, too, should the
federal government be limited in its ability to recognize new authors under
the Copyright Clause.
The original intent of the Copyright Clause was to secure the preexisting
rights of human authors. Subsequent expansions of copyright protections
merely expanded the type of mediums that are protected, not the type of
authors that are protected. Without a clear authorization by the
Constitution, whether developed from precedent or history, how can the
courts or the legislative branch recognize a new property right never before
contemplated? The federal government cannot. The area of property rights
is clearly regulated, and often created, by the states.
It would be an inappropriate overstep into the states’ spheres of
governance for the federal government to recognize animal property rights.
To do so would upend state property schemes that, as of now, only
recognize animals as property themselves. The changing standard of
consciousness and awareness as the basis for property rights is something
that should be experimented with in the states, and then possibly

206. Id.
207. Id.
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recognized and secured by the federal government, not vice versa.208 A
federal government that violates states’ sovereignty over property law is one
that violates the very basis for our Union: federalism and separate spheres
of governance.
VI. CONCLUSION
American copyright law had its beginning in the newly formed states just
prior to the creation of the United States of America. It was not created by
the Constitution, but was rather secured and protected by a national
government out of necessity. Precedent and statutory history lay no
foundation upon which copyright can be expanded to include animal
authorship. In addition, the separation of powers doctrine would disallow
the Supreme Court from reinterpreting the Clause to include animal
authors.
Lastly, the Supreme Court has recognized its role in the realm of
property jurisprudence and that is one most often of deferral and respect
for the states’ ability to regulate their own property law schemes. To allow
the courts or any other federal branch to rewrite state law by allowing
animal ownership of property would shatter the divides of the federal
system. State property law should be regulated by the states and secured by
the federal government. Therefore, until the states recognize animals as
having the ability to own property, the federal government must not grant
copyrights to monkeys. Monkey see, monkey sue is, in fact, bad law.

208. As Justice Brandeis famously wrote, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).

